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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This is a second sentencing appeal. The panel in thefirst 
appeal reversed the initial sentence and remanded for 
proceedings on defendant Juan Faulks's application for a 
downward departure for extraordinary acceptance of 
responsibility. The District Court thereupon held a full 
hearing and rejected the request for a downward departure 
in a written opinion. This appeal requires us to decide 
whether Faulks's sentencing must be returned to the 
District Court for a third time because that court, which 
imposed the new sentence by a written judgment, did so in 
Faulks's absence. We answer the question in the 
affirmative, and hold that Faulks must be resentenced in 
person, notwithstanding that in an ancillary proceeding 
after the new sentence was imposed, the District Court 
informed Faulks in open Court of the sentence it already 
had imposed. 
 
We also conclude that neither: (1) the delivery of that 
information in open court; nor (2) the unlikelihood that 
pronouncement of the sentence in open court in the 
defendant's presence would have yielded a different 
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sentence renders the error of pronouncement of sentence in 
absentia harmless. In our view, the notion that the 
sentencing court must "eyeball" the defendant at the 
instant it exercises its most important judicial 
responsibility, whose daunting character has not been 
eliminated by the Sentencing Reform Act and the 
Sentencing Guidelines, is far from a formality. Rather, it is 
the embodiment of a value deeply embedded in our polity 
(and our jurisprudence). 
 
Although the District Court appears to have had a settled 
view of this case, we are satisfied that it will re-visit the 
matter with a completely open mind at the de novo 
resentencing that must now take place, perforce with an 
updated presentence report. We therefore reject the 
defendant's contention that we should remand for 
sentencing before a different judge. 
 
I. 
 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Faulks pled guilty to 
cocaine distribution, money laundering, and criminal 
forfeiture of real property. The Government agreed to 
dismiss remaining counts of criminal forfeiture in exchange 
for Faulks's acquiescence in the administrative forfeiture of 
personal property described in the indictment. The 
prosecution also agreed to move for a downward departure 
under U.S.S.G. S 5K1.1 if Faulks provided substantial 
assistance in the prosecution of another offender. The 
Presentence Investigation Report calculated the sentencing 
guideline range for Faulks to be 87 to 108 months 
imprisonment. The District Court sentenced him to 95 
months. A panel of this Court upheld the District Court's 
decision to impose a sentence within the guideline range, 
even though the court claimed to have granted the 
government's motion to depart below it. This Court 
interpreted the District Court's statement on granting the 
downward departure as harmless error. See United States v. 
Faulks, 143 F.3d 133, 137 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
Notwithstanding its approval of the District Court's 
treatment of the departure request, the panel reversed the 
judgment and remanded for consideration of whether 
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Faulks, who had already received a three-level decrease 
under S 3E1.1 for acceptance of responsibility, deserved a 
departure under S 5K2.0 in view of his claim that his 
voluntary waiver of meritorious defenses to forfeiture 
constituted an "extraordinary" acceptance of responsibility. 
The District Court did not permit Faulks to build a record 
on this claim because it concluded that Faulks's plea 
agreement did not, in fact, foreclose him from contesting 
the civil forfeiture. The panel disagreed. Though the panel 
expressed doubt that Faulks's waiver merited a departure 
for extraordinary acceptance of responsibility, it opined that 
Faulks deserved the opportunity to develop a record on the 
claim. See id. at 138. 
 
On remand, the District Court considered both Faulks's 
request for a departure based on his agreement not to 
contest the forfeitures and new claims of post-conviction 
rehabilitation. After receiving submissions and conducting 
a hearing, the District Court denied the motion. Faulks 
spoke at the hearing, was questioned by the Court, and his 
counsel later filed a supplemental memorandum. At the 
hearing, Faulks's attorney did not complain that Faulks's 
ability to speak to the court was inadequate or curtailed in 
any manner. As the hearing was ending, defense counsel 
noted that Faulks had a right to be present when the 
sentencing decision was issued. Despite the District Court's 
statement that it would probably announce its decision 
orally as well as by written form, it made its ruling via a 
memorandum opinion and order in Faulks's absence. 
 
This appeal followed. Though the District Court's order is 
styled as a denial of Faulks's motion for a downward 
departure, it is plainly the final order of the District Court 
in this matter, as the District Court viewed the prior 
sentence as remaining in effect. We therefore have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 and 18 U.S.C. S 3742. 
After the notice of appeal was filed, and jurisdiction over 
this case was in this Court, the District Court announced 
its ruling in Faulks's presence. 
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II. 
 
A. 
 
In remanding the matter to the District Court, the prior 
panel "reversed" its judgment of sentence. The parties agree 
that the prior panel must be seen as directing a full 
resentencing.1 Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure states in no uncertain terms that "[t]he 
defendant shall be present . . . at the imposition of 
sentence . . . ." The rule makes an exception for situations 
in which the proceeding involves a reduction or correction 
of sentence under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) 
or (c) or 18 U.S.C. S 3582(c). These exceptions are not 
applicable in this case. It is clear therefore that the District 
Court should have given its decision in open court with 
Faulks present. The government concedes this point. See 
Brief of Appellee at 13. The only question is what the 
remedy should be. The government maintains that Faulks 
has already received an adequate remedy, and that nothing 
more need be done other than the filing of a new judgment. 
We disagree. 
 
We begin our analysis by noting that "[o]ne of the most 
basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause 
is the accused's right to be present in the courtroom at 
every stage of his trial." Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 
(1970) (citing Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892)). 
The oral pronouncement of sentence in the defendant's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The government points out that it could have sought clarification of 
the prior panel's mandate in order to explore further whether full 
resentencing was indeed required. It concedes, however, that it did not 
and that under the circumstances, Faulks's presence was indeed 
required when the District Court announced its decision in this case. 
See Brief of Appellee at 13 & n.2. We think this concession appropriate 
in light of the District Court's error in not allowing Faulks to build a 
record on his claimed extraordinary acceptance of responsibility. A result 
of the remand, therefore, was the District Court's having additional facts 
on which the discretionary aspects of its decision could be based. As 
discussed below, evidence of Faulks's acceptance of responsibility could 
have affected the District Court's determination of the appropriate 
sentence within the guidelines range even if the motion to depart was 
not granted. 
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presence is therefore of special importance. A long line of 
cases provides that when the two sentences are in conflict, 
the oral pronouncement prevails over the written judgment. 
See, e.g., United States v. Chasmer, 952 F.2d 50, 52 (3d 
Cir. 1991); United States v. Daddino, 5 F.3d 262, 266 n.5 
(7th Cir. 1993) (collecting cases); United States v. A-Abras, 
Inc., 185 F.3d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1999). Thus, Rule 43's 
requirement that the defendant be present at the 
imposition of sentence is not a meaningless formality. 
Rather, as we have observed supra at page 3, it is a 
fundamental procedural guarantee that places the 
defendant before the judge at a culminating moment of the 
criminal judicial process. 
 
In the past, this Court has ordered resentencing in the 
defendant's presence as a remedy for a violation of Rule 43. 
See Wilmore v. United States, 565 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1977). 
Faulks's case, however, involves an otherwise valid 
judgment of sentence that was reversed for resentencing on 
one specific issue. Nothing in the record suggests that the 
first sentencing order did not conform with Rule 43's 
requirements. There is therefore a question whether vacatur 
and remand is proper under these circumstances. 
 
United States v. Moree, 928 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1991), 
involves analogous facts. In Moree, the Court of Appeals 
vacated a district court's sentence and remanded because 
of a misapplication of the Sentencing Guidelines. See id. at 
655. On remand, the district court adjusted the sentence 
downward, but sentenced the defendant in absentia. See id. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the new 
sentence and remanded again. See id. at 656. The court 
noted that there is a significant difference between an 
appellate court's order to modify an existing sentence and 
the imposition of a new sentence after the first has been 
vacated. See id. at 655. It conceived the latter circumstance 
as presenting the need for the same constitutional and 
statutory protections a defendant receives when being 
sentenced by a judge exercising discretion. Quoting Justice 
Harlan, the court observed: 
 
       [T]he requirements of criminal justice . . . leave no 
       doubt of [the defendant's] right to be present when a 
       final determination of sentence is made. . . . Even if he 
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       has spoken earlier, a defendant has no assurance that 
       when the time comes for final sentence the district 
       judge will remember the defendant's words in his 
       absence and give them due weight. Moreover, only at 
       the final sentencing can the defendant respond to a 
       definitive decision of the judge. 
 
Id. at 656 (quoting United States v. Behrens, 375 U.S. 162, 
167-68 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result)). We 
agree. The defendant's presence at sentencing is a deeply 
rooted procedural protection and no mere formality. We see 
no reason why that principle should not carry full force at 
a resentencing. 
 
We therefore conclude that Moree is both persuasive and 
directly applicable. The previous panel "reversed," effectively 
vacating the sentence without directing a particular result. 
Cf. Moree, 928 F.2d at 656 ("[T]he mandate rendered 
[defendant's] previous sentence null and void. While we 
might have fashioned the mandate differently, we did not; 
the vacatur is the law of the case . . . ."). The District Court 
therefore had discretion on remand in imposing a sentence. 
This case, therefore, is distinguishable from those in which 
courts have ruled that procedural protections are less 
important when resentencing decisions on remand are not 
discretionary. See United States v. Parker, 101 F.3d 527, 
528 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding defendant's presence 
unnecessary when resentencing is a nondiscretionary 
correction of the original sentence); cf. United States v. 
Tamayo, 80 F.3d 1514 (11th Cir. 1996) (declaring district 
court's failure to give defendant opportunity to allocute was 
not an error when issue on resentencing was limited to a 
question of law and defendant did not request allocution 
despite presence in court); United States v. Nolley, 27 F.3d 
80 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding harmless any error in failing to 
have defendant represented by counsel at resentencing 
when resentencing was to conform to specific mandate from 
appeals court and any sentence other than that imposed 
would have constituted reversible error). Faulks should 
therefore receive a sentence in conformance with Rule 43, 
i.e., one imposed in his presence.2 In opposing Faulks's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Our ruling is consistent with United States v. Ammar, 919 F.2d 13 (3d 
Cir. 1990). In Ammar, a defendant received a sentence without a three- 
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petition, the government claims that Faulks has already 
received an adequate remedy through the District Court's 
announcing its decision in Faulks's presence after the filing 
of the notice of appeal. This argument hints at harmless 
error analysis. Although this Court has previously applied 
harmless error analysis to a Rule 43 case in the context of 
voir dire of a jury, see United States v. Alessandrello, 637 
F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1980), we do not think it appropriate in 
this case.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
year special parole term that was required by the statute under which he 
was convicted. See id. at 14. After the death of the sentencing judge, the 
case was transferred to another judge who amended the sentence to 
include the mandatory term without the defendant present. See id. The 
defendant sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the original 
judge did not intend the defendant to have so long a sentence. 
 
This Court concluded that the amended sentence was imposed 
improperly. See id. at 15. It went on to state: 
 
        Because the revised sentence was imposed in an illegal manner, 
       petitioner should have the opportunity to have the sentence vacated 
       and reimposed in his presence. We recognize that in this case, 
       because the original sentencing judge is deceased, it will be 
difficult 
       to argue about the judge's intent, but we will not foreclose 
petitioner 
       from having that opportunity. Nevertheless, because the sentence is 
       legal as it stands, we see no reason to vacate it. We will, 
however, 
       remand so that the district court can set a date for resentencing 
at 
       which [defendant] may be present. At that time, the court may 
       vacate the original sentence and impose a shorter term if 
[defendant] 
       shows convincingly that is consistent with the original intent. 
 
Id. at 16. Ammar does not clarify when vacatur based on a violation of 
Rule 43 is necessary. Though we did not direct an actual resentencing, 
Ammar is distinguishable from the current facts because Ammar's initial 
proceeding involved the mandatory amendment of a sentence, not a 
vacatur or reversal. Even then, an opportunity for resentencing in 
defendant's presence was indicated. In Faulks's case, in contrast, the 
proceeding that we review involved the reversal of Faulks's first sentence 
by a prior panel, which requires de novo resentencing. Therefore there is 
not a simple correction of a sentence, but a new sentence altogether. 
Ammar is thus consistent with requiring another remand to the District 
Court for resentencing. 
 
3. One other court has applied harmless error analysis in an analogous 
case. In United States v. Huntley, 535 F.2d 1400, 1404 (5th Cir. 1976), 
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Because the government does not argue harmless error 
despite the availability of Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 52(a) ("Any error, defect, irregularity or variance 
which does not affect substantial rights shall be 
disregarded."), it has not even attempted to meet its burden 
of establishing the error's harmlessness. See O'Neal v. 
McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 437-38 (1995). We can employ 
harmless error analysis sua sponte. See United States v. 
McLaughlin, 126 F.3d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 1997) (discussing 
court discretion to raise harmless error of erroneous 
admission of evidence). However, this is an inappropriate 
case to do so given both that a reversal will not lead to 
drawn out proceedings and that, as discussed below, we 
cannot know with sufficient certainty that the error was 
harmless. See id. 
 
Even if we were to employ harmless error analysis, 
resentencing remains appropriate. The Rule 43 error in this 
case implicates constitutional concerns, see United States 
v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1397 (3d Cir. 1994) ("The due 
process clause of the Fifth Amendment grants criminal 
defendants the `right to be present at all stages of the trial 
where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the 
proceedings . . . .' " (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 
806, 819 n.15 (1975))), making the establishment of 
harmlessness more difficult. Given that there are still 
significant discretionary elements in the sentencing 
decision of the District Court, we cannot be sure that "there 
is no reasonable possibility," Alessandrello, 637 F.2d at 
139, that the District Judge's failure to impose Faulks's 
sentence in his presence had no effect on the duration of 
the sentence imposed. 
 
We also cannot say that the District Court's announcing 
its decision in Faulks's presence after it lost jurisdiction 
over the matter is an adequate remedy. To be sure, it is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the court found that a judge's rendering a judgment of conviction out of 
the defendants' presence to be a harmless error. That court, however, 
cautioned that courts should avoid judgments in absentia, see id., and 
Moree, which arose later in the same circuit, did not engage in similar 
analysis in its mandating a resentencing. 
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unlikely that resentencing in Faulks's presence will have an 
effect given that remand concerned an issue on which the 
District Court decided against the defendant. But the 
responsibility confronting a district court judge when he or 
she sentences a convicted defendant is an awesome one. 
The presence of a defendant may well affect a judge in the 
discharge of this most solemn of duties, a duty that still 
survives in an age of cabined discretion in the wake of the 
Sentencing Guidelines. Even the determination of where to 
sentence within the guidelines range can mean the 
difference of months of confinement, an important 
consideration to a defendant. It is not at all unlikely that a 
judge may enter court of one mind about what sentence is 
appropriate in the abstract, only to modify the 
pronouncement when faced with a live human being in 
open court. 
 
Perhaps when the District Court faces Faulks, it will 
consider the evidence presented in the S 5K2.0 proceeding 
and adjust his sentence within the guidelines range 
notwithstanding the fact that the S 5K2.0 motion was 
denied. Perhaps not. But the only way to ensure that 
Faulks receives the procedural protection of being 
"eyeballed" by the sentencing judge is to follow the mandate 
of Rule 43 as it is written. We will therefore vacate the 
judgment and remand with the direction that the District 
Court resentence Faulks in full accordance with the 
applicable Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. This new 
sentencing proceeding must, perforce, be de novo. 
 
III. 
 
Faulks also requests that a new judge be assigned his 
case on remand. We see no reason to so order. The prior 
panel considered, and rejected, a similar request. We do not 
see anything in subsequent proceedings to alter this 
conclusion. Faulks claims that in its interactions with him, 
the District Court demonstrated an unwillingness to give 
him a fair hearing. Our review of the record does not 
persuade us that this is the case. 
 
We acknowledge the considerable force of the argument 
that a new judge should still be assigned as a prophylactic 
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against a natural tendency for any judge, having once made 
up his or her mind, to have settled views when told to 
revisit a sentencing decision for the third time. Given the 
facts of this case, we are confident, however, that the 
District Judge will have a completely open mind at 
resentencing and, after giving Faulks the opportunity for 
unimpeded allocution, will pronounce a fair sentence. 
 
The judgment of the sentence will be vacated and the 
case remanded to the District Court for resentencing. 
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